
So yeah, you may noticed that it's been a little while since I blogged. I've written TONS... just not posted much cuz most of it's been for my post-grad work. Some of it's decent, some is pretty dry. I decided I should just start posting some of the stuff that really jacks me up, anyway. So here's my caveat, some of it may get a little heady... some may get REALLY long and some might be simple book reviews, etc. In any event, you may find it interesting. If you don't, then you don't have to read it... anyhow, following is one of my favorite pieces... just trying to open a can of hellacious worms and look at the Arminian/Calvinism debate!
Against the Divine Machine: The Nature of Determinism, Which is the Logical Conclusion at the Far Edge of the Calvinistic Pendulum
Introduction
Humorist and cartoonist Bill Watterson named half of the iconic duo Calvin and Hobbes after theologian John Calvin. Ironically, or perhaps with purpose, Calvin once asks his friend if he believed his destiny was already fixed by cosmic forces. Hobbes is a nonbeliever while Calvin is sure. “Really? How come?” Hobbes asks. “Life’s a lot more fun when you’re not responsible for your actions,” Calvin replies. While meant in jest, it is this Deterministic creed which many live their lives by.
Determinism is the belief that human actions are the result of antecedent causes which have been formulated naturalistically or theistically. The natural viewpoint sees every action as resulting from, and causing another, action ad infinitum. This makes humans a part of “the machinery of the universe.” Theistic Determinism sees all of these predetermined actions as a direct result of God’s control. While it may be a nice platitude meant to reassure the troubled soul, how much control over daily minutia do we mean to infer God actively has when we say, “Don’t worry; God is in total control.” How does that impact the nature of God, specifically His love and justice?
Many scholars, even those theologians normally opposed to each other, make the same point that God’s loving character or his loving nature (as revealed to us in scripture) would be inaccurate if there were no such thing as free will; as typical to such a debate, such a war is won in the definition of the terms and thus “Free Will” becomes hotly debated. Even most hardcore determinists claim there is such a thing as free will and the exercise thereof, however they redefine freedom or will in order to fit their theology into an acceptable mold. The devil is in the details.
Problematic Deterministic Theodicy
The primary apologetic Calvinists are determined to reinforce is to find a way to reconcile this nature of God with predestination or election, especially when the concept of double-predestination is scrutinized (whereby the “nonelect” are condemned to Hell after judgment: a sentence which they had no control to avoid). It seems that a God of such Deterministic machinations is neither just nor loving. A loving, omnipotent God cannot predetermine the damnation of certain souls while his love remains intact; does He truly love everybody if the option of Hell remains on the table and such Election or nonelection remains unconditional? A God of love is not omnipotent if he cannot simply save the souls of the ones he loves.
Justice cannot truly exist under the umbrella of Determinism. Sometimes God may seem to appear unjust, but only ever at the benefit of those He loves; God does not give what is undeserved except when he gives a reprieve, this is fundamental to Grace.
Debate over this specific issue has raged for generations, and for good reasons. Either point taken to the extreme results in an unbalanced theodicy and potentially discredits the rationality behind Theology. Taken to the far edge, Calvinism becomes staunchly predestination and stifles all free will—humans have no capacity to make their own decisions and God is a great machine, this results from the second point of Calvinists’ TULIP: Unconditional Election. We will examine this concept further.
On the other end of the spectrum Arminianism risks infringing upon the sovereignty and power of God. The same was mentioned in regards to Determinism, though more in the hyperbolic context of love and the nonelect. Arminianism, taken to the edge, elevates human authority above the rule and dominion of God; presented as a theodicy the extremity of this viewpoint is the Open Theism view.
This paper deals primarily with the side of Determinism. Admittedly, it leans towards an Arminian bent. Particularly this is because of my belief that I am a sinner and my acceptance and acknowledgement that I cannot do otherwise without the help of a savior. This may sound like the exact opposite argument Calvinists expect, perhaps even like a point in their favor. I expect Justice, however, and I know and understand that no penance can recompense God for violating His laws. But if God chose for me to commit my sins, and will then punish me for them, then He is not just. If God cannot stand sin and foreordains all mankind to sin, thus expelling us yet desiring us to come to Him, then He is not logical. Chiefly Justice, but also other of God’s traits are of primary concern to this study.
Any study of God’s Justice or Love must include a logical theodicy, or a whole theology that explains the existence of sin or moral evil. At Determinism’s worst, a skewed theodicy results whereby God willingly forces men to commit atrocities that violate the moral law the theodicy is meant to explain.
While many Calvinists might argue that such a belief is not the intent of TULIP theology, it is the natural outcropping of this theology. In fact, the position that God causes humans to sin was taught by Theodore Beza, John Calvin’s immediate successor.
Calvinist theologian and philosopher Gordon Haddon Clark makes his thoughts expressly clear in his writings. “I wish very frankly and pointedly to assert that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it was the will of God that he should do it.” It is this position of Clark, and similar positions, which this paper explores. Clark presses his point, “Let it be unequivocally said that this view certainly makes God the cause of sin. God is the sole ultimate cause of everything. There is absolutely nothing independent of him. He alone is the eternal being. He alone is omnipotent.” Clark’s position is hotly contended by many passages of scripture.
Natural Determinism
Clark’s type of theology is certainly dangerous to the health of the general public. While not endorsing the view that theology mesh with contemporary existential understanding, it would certainly make the topic less hotly debated.
John Calvin insisted that the doctrine of predestination does not lead to carelessness regarding morality, or the cavalier attitude that one can continue to sin care-free since his or her election is assured. Calvin insists that knowledge of our election leads us to pursue holy living. One wonders how much time Calvin spent with other humans given that viewpoint; like utopian communism, such an idea looks good on paper but seems contrary to human nature. Psychologist Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler enacted experiments to examine whether participants who believed that human behavior is predetermined would be more encouraged to cheat. Exposure to a message implying a deterministic worldview increased cheating on a task in which participants could passively allow a flawed computer program to reveal answers to mathematical problems which they'd been instructed to solve themselves. Increased cheating was mediated by decreased belief in free will. In another experiment, participants who read statements endorsing free will did not cheat while their counterparts did. These findings suggest that the debate over free will has societal, as well as scientific and theoretical, implications.
The worst of these implications is the total abandonment of any form of theology and the universality of atheism. The rejection of freewill emasculates any concept of moral obligation. Author-philosopher and Faraday Institute Associate Nicholas Beale asserts that denying freewill “is the closest thing I can imagine to a scientific refutation of Christianity.”
Beale differs from modern scientific thought in that his philosophical presuppositions leave room in the framework for the possibility of a god. Beale’s quote is a common assertion among the atheistic community. Much of those, touting science as the ultimate answer, have worked the Deterministic angle as a proof against God. Beale claims a personal belief in evolution and even makes a philosophical argument for its logical necessity to increase the attribute of Love and goodness of God although it seems to disagree with his position regarding causation of “natural evils” such as earthquakes. Thus, we see what science has to offer Determinists.
Stephen Hawking notes the impossibility of scientific Determinism explaining nonquantifiable, factual data. “Gödel’s theorem, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and the practical impossibility of following the evolution of even a deterministic system that becomes chaotic, form a core set of limitations to scientific knowledge that only came to be appreciated during the twentieth century.” Hawking is admitting that any phenomena that cannot be measured or empirically observed and cannot therefore be reduced to quantitative analysis (things such as “meaning,” “beauty,” or “justice”) cannot be explained by science. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle alone wrecks any argument for Determinism.
Science, then, has left us bereft of answers. The scientific community can agree that they place their faith in the Darwinian model and the evolutionary process. They cannot agree, however, as to the best way to disprove God: to invalidate their agnosticism with proven cause for atheism. While determinism seems an option on face value, it alone cannot explain justice and other philosophical concepts outside the realm of science. Scientific based Determinism cannot touch God and so philosophy is appealed to. Beale notes, “The idea that [Determinism] is, philosophically, a defeater for religious belief is mistaken.” And so, science appeals to philosophy to sound the death knell of God, and philosophy demands the same of science. Science cannot answer these questions because these concepts are immeasurable and unobservable.
Philosophy tries to grasp onto the theological precepts, however, philosophy does not operate with an accurate concept of evil. Beale, and other philosophers, often define “evil” from within an existential framework. Evil is something which causes feelings other than pleasure. “It is clear that, if you love someone, you do not knowingly allow them to suffer serious pain or evil without sufficiently good reasons. People do suffer serious pain and evil, and at least some (most Christians would say, all) of them are people whom God loves.” Beale’s view of evil, that it would include natural disasters and such occurrences, seems to compromise God’s loving nature. How does one reconcile those positions? The answer is the opposite of Determinism, or Open Theism, whereby God surrenders his omniscience and sovereignty except to act in specific situations to ensure His will is enacted. Arguing for some form of Determinism we arrive at its antithesis and neither conclusion integrates well with the Biblical source data.
Theological Determinism
Since philosophy and science both fail to adequately come to terms with the God of the Bible, the only logical place to turn is to the pages of Scripture itself. The Determinism concept, in various forms and doctrines, is something that theologians have grapple with for ages; even in the 1800s it was pointedly asserted that the Determinism paradigm was unsolvable and yet is also a topic that we cannot just sweep under the rug. Francis Garden wrote about Gordon H. Clark’s God/murder situation a hundred years prior. “How can we say of the very same thing that it has been decreed by the will of God, and that it is contrary to that will? ...an absolute shutting up of the question is unsatisfactory, and in reducing ourselves to silence we may bring on an oblivion of much important truth. Either something is God’s will or it is not. Clark takes the notions set forth in Puritan Calvinist Jonathan Edwards’ Freedom of the Will, whereby God decrees what he foreknows and mankind acts on this (thus redefining “Free Will,”) and eradicates the attempted separation of the individual’s freedom to act from God’s compulsory, decretive will.
In Garden’s version of the murder story, a man is murdered and he asks the hypothetical question of how we counsel his widow. If we believe in predestination, then surely the murder must be the will of God. “A large portion of the events which happen in this world is made up of men's crimes, sins, wrong-doings of every imaginable degree. Has God predestined them? And if not, where are we to draw the line?”
Is there a theology that treads the middle path? Freewill Theism, a form of Self-Determinism, is any type of theological model that affirms that, contrary to Process Theism, (which is a facet of Open Theism,) “God can unilaterally intervene in earthly affairs and does so at times” while still denying a fundamental precept of Theological Determinism, “that God can both grant individuals freedom and control its use.”
Scriptural Analysis
In decoding the theological impetus behind Determinism, one must look at the biblical concept of election. In the New Testament, Paul the Apostle joins love with the principle of election on at least four occasions. As mentioned earlier, love is a fundamental aspect which must be reconcilable within one’s theodicy.
Very specifically, it is worth looking at Paul’s background as he penned the manuscripts surrounding election. Timo Eskola does an excellent job forming a solid exegesis of Paul’s writings. He begins with the Jewish context for Paul's theologizing. Eskola focuses especially on the demonstrably pre-New Tesatament material such as select apocalypses, wisdom books, and the Qumran documents.
Using Sirach as his key witness, Eskola argues that the sapiential tradition reflects a significant departure from the Deuteronomic approach to Israel's salvation. The varied responses to persecution among Jews compelled the wisdom teachers to adopt a new eschatological dualism, according to which personal salvation was not ultimately determined just on the basis of covenantal election, but also on the basis of fidelity to the law. There exists, then, a significant departure in electoral belief structure from one Testament to the next, that departure can be traced back to the inter-testamental period.
A similar picture emerges from a study of key apocalyptic books (I Enoch, Jubilees, 4 Ezra) and of the Qumran material. In all these sources, the soteriology is also synergistic: one's covenantal status is not, in itself, sufficient for deliverance. One must validate that status through observance of the law. Proof was required of commitment to that elected status. Important to this soteriology within Eskola’s argument is that predestination in these writings is not deterministic. Even at Qumran, the destiny of human beings is not fixed by divine decree but left open to the choices people make either to follow or to reject the way of law-keeping. Given the background material it is reasonable to suggest that the original audience of the Pauline writings would understand the concept of “election” under similar terms.
Eskola’s theodicy is complete, allowing fully for both God’s wrath and his salvation. Paul radicalizes the Jewish understanding in that all people are bound by sin and subject therefore to God's wrath. No longer is there a basis, at least at the outset, for positive human response to God. Paul's solution is not the predestination of individuals, such as in the Augustinian and Calvinist tradition, but a universal Christological predestination. “All human beings have first been predestined to damnation. All men have been ‘elected’ to find salvation in Christ”
Eskola concludes that predestination involves universal election in Christ, but this universal election does not necessarily bring salvation to all. Election involves the provision in Christ of atonement for all, but “does not yet deliver salvation to individuals.” This is perhaps the most frank and literal reading of the scripture one will find when they study the topic both systematically and exegetically.
Conclusion
The idea of God’s omniscience, free will, and predestination in most current thought and theology is linear. In Theistic Determinism, God created originally and set everything in motion, this makes all subsequent events contingent and thus predestined. The problem with this is that we are limiting an infinite God. “Determinism is the view that there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future,” according to Peter van Inwagen, the noted philosopher and metaphysicist. Limiting the dimension of God by our human perspective, we act just like the residents of Abbott’s Flatland, not able to see beyond our own dimension and understand that some objects transcend our own reality; who better fits that description but God.
Imagine a world map with a pin on a specific location; the map fails to take into account the fact that the earth is not a mere two dimensional layout (which anyone not believing the world is flat can agree with.) A point on a map is insufficient for a miner wishing to harvest minerals from a mountain marked by the map, there is also a depth or elevation necessary with the dimensional coordinates; any person who has installed a satellite receiver on the roof knows that they cannot receive the proper signal with just the number of circular degrees, but must also measure and pinpoint the dish’s azimuth in order to locate their signal source. An exponentially increasing number of possibilities might exist in a true free-will scenario, though only one reality exists, as far as our base assumptions on the nature of the universe (which some philosophers may argue is a weighty assumption) and therefore we base our theodicy and theology on destiny and election on this very notion.
Perhaps it would be more fitting with the character and nature of God, especially his infinite nature, to reenvision the base model of divine knowledge as a visual family tree where every branch is a point in time related to an individual and to their available options at that point in time (even taking into account contingency and natural leanings of that man). This would obviously create quite an immense, tangled and intertwined tree branching off with such a large and ever expanding number of variables that it boggles the mind… the human mind that is. This a limitation of the human mind, however, and must be reconciled with a limitless God who can easily encompass far more than our mind can ever achieve—we cannot compare our perception of reality versus the Infinite One. While this thinking might be less understandable, it is perhaps easier to reconcile with the concept of sovereignty, omniscience, and the Calvinist accusation of a limited God given an Arminian perspective. Perhaps that is what is called for in developing a new theodicy for a contemporary rational age: that we finite beings surrender the need to understand everything about an infinite God, or even begin to open ourselves to the possibility of things beyond our finite dimension. Perhaps then we can find some genuine common ground with each other.
Election must remain within the realm of soteriology and not venture beyond its doctrinal borders without doing much harm to the doctrine of free will. In any discussion of election, we must begin with Jesus and restrain taking liberties with any theology we have merely inferred from the text.
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